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A  Willingness  to  Play:  Analysis  of
Water  Resources  Development
William  E.  Martin, Helen  Ingram and Nancy  K.  Laney
Economic analysis  shows that the Central Arizona Project will be a poor investment
from  the point  of view of individual  farmers.  Yet farmers  support  the  Project.  In  this
study  of the  economics  and  politics  of the  CAP,  farmers  are  questioned  as  to  their
information,  perceptions and motivations.  Farmers are willing to play - not necessarily
to  pay.
A central tenet of economic analysis  is that
people making market decisions pursue their
own self interest.  Public choice scholars have
attempted  to  extend  this  reasoning  beyond
the domain  of individual market decisions  to
collective  choices  in  political  and  organiza-
tional settings.  While  falling  far short of ex-
plaining  all  individual  behaviour,  public
choice research  indicates  that the hypothesis
of  self-interested  motivation  provides  the
best  grounds  for  predictions  of how  people
will  act  [Mitchell].  However,  what  consti-
tutes  self-interest  is  often  difficult  to  deter-
mine.  People act on the basis of perceptions,
and the  way they  see benefits  may be  very
different  from  the way  objective  policy ana-
lysts might see them.
The behaviour  of Arizona  farmers  relative
to  the  construction  of the  Central  Arizona
Project  (CAP) illustrates  the  gap  that  exists
between  self-interest  as  it  is viewed by  eco-
nomic  analysts  and as  political  actors  see  it.
While  economic  analysis  by  agricultural
economists from outside the Bureau of Recla-
mation  has  indicated  that  the  CAP  would
yield fewer benefits  and larger costs  to farm-
ers than continued pumping  of groundwater
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[Young and Martin;  Kelso,  Martin and Mack;
Boster  and  Martin].  Arizona  agriculturalists
have  consistently  believed  it  to be  in  their
interest  to  take  a position  strongly  favoring
the project.
In fact,  farmers in the state have been the
CAP's  most  loyal  supporters  and  advocates
over its thirty year history.  The project,  first
brought before  Congress  in  1948  and finally
authorized  in  1968,  is a massive water  deliv-
ery  system  which  will  transport  Colorado
River water to the central part of Arizona.  It
consists  of  a  series  of pumping  plants  and
aqueducts which will lift the water over 2,000
feet  in elevation  and carry it more  than  300
miles.  Although  originally  envisioned  as  an
agricultural "rescue" project,  the focus  of the
CAP has  since  shifted toward  urban and In-
dian  users,  both  of whom  will  have  priority
over Anglo farmers in CAP water allocations.
The project  currently  is under construction,
but no final water allocations have been made
and no irrigation  district  or farmer contracts
have been  signed.  Initial  deliveries  of water
are  not  expected  before  1986  in  the  areas
closest  to the  project's  origin,  and not  until
several  years  later elsewhere.
Since conventional  economic analysis  does
not  explain  farmer actions,  we turned  to  an
examination  of  the  farmers'  perceptions  of
self-interest.  This  examination  was  accom-
plished  through  a  field  survey.  From  the
observed  attitudes  and  perceptions  of  the
interviewed  farmers,  along with an examina-
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tion  of  the  political  environment  over  the
years  in which the project has been planned,
a paradigm  of decision making was developed
that  has  characteristics  similar  to  games
where risk and uncertainty  foster the pursuit
of strategies.  Thus,  we  refer to the  farmers'
"willingness  to  play"  the  game  of western
water  resources development.
Propositions  for Analysis
Our intent was  to understand  the benefits
and costs associated with the CAP in the past
and the benefits and costs as farmers current-
ly see them.  What are  the perceived  oppor-
tunities and risks created by their support for
the project?
The CAP game has been in progress a long
time  and how the winnings  are  ultimately to
be distributed and who the losers might be is
becoming  somewhat  more  clear.  There  is
basis  for farmers  to  fear  that less CAP water
will  be  available  for a  shorter time  and at  a
higher  cost  than  they  had  anticipated.
Moreover,  the  rules  and  regulations  as-
sociated  with obtaining  the water  may place
real  constraints  upon  farmers'  groundwater
use.  The  federal  government  required  new
groundwater  legislation  in  Arizona  in return
for  funding  the  project.  If  Arizona  farmers
make  choices  on  the  basis  of  rational  self-
interest as we suppose they do, the change  in
expected benefits  and costs should be reflect-
ed  in  their  attitudes  toward  the  project.
Thus,  we  designed  our survey  based on  the
following hypotheses:
1.  Farmers  in  the  best  position  vis-a-vis
the  CAP  - closest  to  the  aqueduct,
with  a distribution system  in place and
earliest  in  line  to  receive  water  -
would be most favorable to the project.
2.  Farmers  in a less desirable position vis-
a-vis  the  CAP  -remote  from  the
aqueduct,  and  with  no  surface  water
distribution  system  in  place  - would
be least favorable  to the project.
3.  Farmers  would  be  interested  and  in-
formed about the details of water  price
and  distribution  costs  associated  with
the CAP. We would expect this interest
and knowledge  because the farmers will
be  increasingly  concerned  about  costs
as the project  approaches  completion.
4.  The higher the farmer's estimate of cost
of  CAP  water,  the  less  favorable  the
farmer would be toward the project.
5.  Farmers  would  express  concern  over
the regulations  encouraging  water con-
servation  tied to receipt  of CAP water.
We  assumed  that  these  regulations
would  be  viewed  as  costs  imposed  by
the project.
Field  Survey  of Farmer Attitudes
and Perceptions
Personal interviews were  conducted in the
10  major  irrigation  districts  in the  state that
had  applied  for  CAP  water.  Twenty-nine
farmers  and four irrigation district  managers
who  were  not  farmers  were  interviewed.
Twenty-eight  sets  of  questions  were  asked
each  respondent  in  an  in-depth  discussion
that often  took  two to  three  hours.  The  re-
spondents  were  not selected at random,  but
rather  by  making  an  initial  contact  in  the
local  area  and finding  names  of  "substantial
local  citizens".  Thus the  respondents  would
be  assumed  to be  better  informed  on  CAP
details  than would  a random selection.
Most irrigated crop farms in the CAP area
have  a typical  cotton,  small  grain and forage
crop  mix -.  but  some  include  vegetables  or
tree  crops.  In  order  to  differentiate  among
the  farmers  according  to  their  situations,
they were asked about the  size and crop  mix
of  their  farms,  the  level  from  which  they
were  pumping,  and  their  estimate  of their
pumping  cost  per  acre-foot.  The  farmers
were then asked a series of questions  relating
to  water  conservation  activities.  Farmers
were also  asked to estimate  the  cost of CAP
water when  it flows  in  1986  and to compare
that  cost  to  estimated  pump  costs  at  that
time.  In  addition,  they  were  asked  about
different  aspects  of the  CAP,  from  its  effect
on the value of their land to the conservation
regulations  tied  to the  project.  These  ques-
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tions  were  included  to test their  knowledge
about details of the project and their opinions
as  to  how  it will  affect  them  personally.  A
copy  of the  questionnaire  is  displayed  in
Ingram,  Martin,  and  Laney.
Since  much of the resulting data was  opin-
ion  about action,  or  statements  of emotional
commitment,  analysis  was necessarily  some-
what informal.  The  responses  were  arrayed
in a matrix of respondents vs.  questions,  and
individuals were classified as to their relative
position  vis-a-vis  the five hypotheses.
Findings
The  following  five  findings  relate,  respec-
tively,  to the five hypotheses  listed above.
1.  Rather than  their  support  for  the  pro-
ject,  what  sets the "most-favored  farm-
ers"  off from  the  others  is  their  more
balanced weighing of the costs and ben-
efits associated with the CAP.  Evident-
ly  these  farmers  see  themselves  in  a
good  strategic  position.  The  largest
amount  of  CAP  water  is  scheduled  to
flow  in  1986 - at the beginning  of the
project.  Agriculture  is  currently  al-
located  more  than half that water,  and
many districts that have  applied for the
water  will  not  yet have  the  ditches  to
receive  it.  Those  farmers  in a  favored
position  figure  that  they  will  be  in  a
good position  to receive water on their
own terms.  Past  experience  of farmers
with  federal  water  projects  has  taught
them  that  the  government  will
negotiate.  The  Bureau  of Reclamation
has  been  willing  to  adapt  contracts  to
the farmers'  situation rather than  hold-
ing rigidly to original  financial plans.
2.  Rather than their opposition to the CAP
(nearly  all  farmers  are  favorable)  what
distinguishes  the  "least-favored  farm-
ers"  is  their  blind  commitment  to the
project.  The  strength  of the  farmers'
emotional  commitment  to  the  project
seems to  vary directly with the degree
to  which  they  feel  threatened  about
their  future.  When  they  feel  "their
backs  against  the  wall,"  they  do  not
question  the  form  in  which  "help"
comes.
Typical of this view were  the farmers
in  the  Central  Arizona  Irrigation  and
Drainage  District,  and  the  Maricopa-
Stanfield  Irrigation  and  Drainage  Dis-
trict.  These two districts currently  rely
exclusively  on  groundwater  and  were
formed  specifically  for  the  purpose  of
receiving CAP water.  By 1986 about 60
percent  of the  wells  in  the  two  areas
will  be  drawing  from  nearly  600  feet.
These  two  districts  are  farthest  of any
from  the  main  canal  and  will  need  to
invest some $1,100 per acre served just
to get the water from the main canal to
their fields  [Beck and Associates].
When  asked  about  these  costs  one
farmer  said  they  would  be  major  but
worth  it.  One  answer  was  "Price
doesn't  matter.  The  point  is  we  need
more  water.  It is  our last chance.  The
price of cotton  is too low".
3.  Contrary  to  expectations,  a  surprising
lack  of information  and  interest  about
details  of the  project  was  found.  The
project  still  seems  very  remote  from
reality.  After  all,  in  the  past year  the
basic  allocation  schemes  had  changed
several  times  and are  still far from  set-
tled;  nor  has  the  likely  cost  of  CAP
water  been  finally  determined.  Esti-
mates  of  state  and  federal  water  au-
thorities  vary widely.  Even if details on
allocations  and  price were  known,  un-
known  exogeneous  variables,  such  as
other  input  costs,  commodity  prices,
and  the  effects  of  inflation,  cloud  the
picture.  The  farmers  are  simply  "play-
ing"  the  game rather  than  considering
"paying"  the costs.
4.  The  water  price  estimated  by  farmers
does not appear to be closely related to
their attitude  about the  CAP.  Farmers
who  expressed  very  positive  attitudes
toward the  CAP were  as  likely  to  esti-
mate a high price  as  farmers who were
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generally  neutral  or  cynical  about  the
CAP. However,  most of the farmers felt
that CAP water would be less expensive
or  at  least  no  more  expensive  than
pump  water at that time.
There are  at least  two problems  with
this  expectation.  No  district  is  to  be
allocated  more than about  fifty percent
of its current water use.  Therefore,  the
pumps  will  remain  and  have  to  be
operated  and  maintained  just  as  they
are  now.  If  the  CAP  water  is  spread
over the whole district,  as  every  inter-
viewee  stated  it  would  be,  all  wells
would have to remain in operation.  The
fixed  costs  of  the  wells  will  remain.
CAP  costs  will  substitute  only  for  the
energy cost of pumping.
The second  problem is the confusion
caused by inflation,  rising energy  costs,
and  the  uncertainty  about  what  costs
will  go into CAP water  costs.  A farmer
stated  that  "It  is  not  conceivable  that
CAP costs  could be  greater than  pump
costs  because  of power  costs.  By  the
year 2000 pump  costs  will be $100 per
acre-foot."  Almost  all farmers  have  the
belief that  CAP costs  will  be relatively
constant, and seem to relate only to the
highly  subsidized  repayment  costs  of
construction.  But  the  CAP  will  have
pumping  and  operating  costs  as  well.
How these costs will be allocated  is not
known, but if pumping costs are  spread
evenly over the whole system  as is like-
ly,  note  that  the  end  of the  system  at
Tucson  is  some  2,000  feet  above  the
beginning of the system  at Parker Dam
on  the  Colorado  River.  Few  farmers
will  be  pumping  groundwater  from
more than  600 feet.
5.  The  farmers were  aware  of the restric-
tions associated with the use of the CAP
water.  They  knew  that  regulations  re-
quire them  to trade  off an  acre-foot  of
pump water  for  each  acre-foot  of CAP
water  received.  They  were  also  aware
of the  existence  of such  regulations  as
the  160  acre  limitation  for  federal
reclamation  projects.  However,  most
respondents  envisioned  strict  enforce-
ment of pump regulations  as unenforce-
able.  Experience  with  the  160  acre
limitation  explains  why  they  may  not
believe rules will be applied as written.
The possible,  but not necessarily  prob-
able,  regulations  associated  with  the
CAP were seen as a secondary matter to
the central objective  of bringing in new
water  at whatever cost.
The  findings  of  our  field  survey  suggest
that  the  political  support  that  agricultural
interests  have given to the CAP represents a
willingness  to play; not  a willingness  to pay.
The paying of costs was not really relevant for
the  debate  over  authorizing,  funding  and
starting construction  of the CAP.  In the bar-
gaining and negotiation to build support,  po-
tential  costs  are  purposely  left  vague  and
generally  are  ignored.  When  the  choices
were  so  structured,  farmers'  support simply
signalled  a  willingness  to  stay  in the  game.
Political  support  for  the  CAP  cannot  auto-
matically  be translated  into concrete  willing-
ness  to  pay  costs  - such  as  the  signing  of
repayment  contracts,  installment of distribu-
tion systems,  and compliance with rules such
as  the  abatement  of groundwater  pumping.
Instead,  we posit that farmers are pursuing a
game that has  the following rules.
Rules  of the Game
The Prize
Water  is a priceless  possession, or,  at least
so  it  traditionally  has  been  viewed  in  the
West.  As  Kelso  pointed  out  in  his  essay  on
the  'Water  is  Different'  syndrome,  Wester-
ners  do  not  calculate  the  value  of water  on
the basis  of its contribution  to production  as
they  do other renewable  resources.  Instead,
water  is  believed  to  give  rise  to  a  Midas
Touch,  creating  wealth  and  guaranteeing  a
prosperous  future  wherever  it  is  present  in
ample quantities.  This conviction  is based on
an  interpretation  of history  rather  than  eco-
nomic  analysis.  Arizonans,  for  instance,  ob-
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serve  that the  Salt  River  Project  was funda-
mental  to  the  enormously  successful  devel-
opment  of Phoenix.  Whatever  the  develop-
ment  of  water  supply  is  estimated  to  cost,
Westerners  tend  to  think  it  is  worth  the
price.  They believe that if water becomes too
expensive,  everything  else will  become  yet
more dear,  and were they to lack a sufficient
supply of this basic ingredient,  they would be
unable  to  reap  the  profits  that  come  with
enterprise  and development.  In short, water
is  conceived  by  Westerners  as  a  coveted
commodity,  a  worthy  prize  for  which  they
are  willing to  engage  in demanding political
games, where pay-offs may come only far into
the future.
In  saying  that  water  is  considered
priceless,  we  do  not  suggest  that  potential
users  will  pay  any  price.  When  it comes  to
signing a contract,  starting a pump,  or open-
ing  a headgate,  users - especially  commer-
cial  users  such  as  farmers  - will  not  pur-
chase more of the water input than the price
of the resulting product  will justify.  Rather,
we  are  saying  that Western water  users  will
compete very hard to keep open the option of
having water available  as a basic ingredient to
profitable  activity.
The actual possession - the physical pres-
ence  of  water  where  and  when  it  may  be
useful - is  the ultimate prize in water poli-
tics.  Thus one must distinguish  between  leg-
al  entitlement  and  actual  possession.  'Wet'
water,  it is  said,  is much more valuable  than
'paper' water.  Western water law establishes
a  complex  hierarchy  of senior  and  junior
entitlements based  on treaty,  compact,  con-
tract,  and  the  historic  record  of use.  While
legal entitlement is  an important resource,  it
is  not  immediately  efficacious.  Being  in  a
position to  actually  use water  is  often much
more significant  than legal entitlement  to it.
Under  the  1922 Colorado  River Compact  as
interpreted by the Supreme Court and mod-
ified  by  Congressional  legislation,  the  State
of California  is  legally  guaranteed  only  4.4
million acre-feet of Colorado River water per
year.  Yet the  actual  annual  use of Colorado
River water by  California has been  closer  to
5.7 million acre-feet,  simply because Califor-
nia has had the physical  structures  necessary
to  convey  and  utilize  it  while  other  states
have  lacked  sufficient  means  to  divert their
full quota of water from the mainstream.  We
thus had  a prime confirming  instance  of the
old adage that possession is nine-tenths of the
law.
Further,  once users acquire  immediate ac-
cess  to water,  they are  in  an excellent  posi-
tion to determine the conditions of its use  as
well as  to thwart outside  interference.  After
studying  six  irrigation  communities  in  Spain
and the United  States,  Maass  and Anderson
[p.  366]  come to  the conclusion  that
"The most powerful conclusion  that emerges from
the case  studies is the extent to which the farmers
of each community have controlled  their own  des-
tinies as farmers,  the extent to which  the farmers
of each community,  acting  collectively,  have  de-
termined  both  the procedures  for  distributing  a
limited water supply and the resolution of conflicts
with other groups  over  the development  of addi-
tional  supplies."
The  Strategy
Physical  possession  of water  supplies,  the
goal of the water game,  typically involves the
construction  of  storage  facilities  and
aqueducts  that redirect water from its natural
course  to the location of water users.  Because
such  water  works  are  technically  difficult,
expensive,  and  often  involve  a  number  of
political jurisdictions,  they often require fed-
eral  authorization,  funding,  and  construc-
tion.  The challenge  presented to initial back-
ers of such water development programs is to
transform  their localized  support base into a
national  one  which  would  be  sufficiently
wide  to  ensure  Congressional  majorities.
Necessarily,  obtaining such  support means  a
strategy  of coalition-building.
As with  many  games,  winning  the  water
game entails  making some concessions  to the
other players.  The benefits of potential water
projects  must be  distributed  so  as  to  attract
unified  state  as  well  as  local  backing.
Through  a  process  of  log  rolling,  potential
opponents must be placated by rewards great
enough to warrant their support [Ingram].  If
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initial  backers  of water  projects  refuse  to
concede  some of their anticipated winnings,
the  game  simply  folds  and  no  one  profits.
Thus project initiators,  in building coalitions,
are  indeed  wise  to  moderate  their  early
hopes for  large gains  as  the game  continues:
smaller winnings, from a rational standpoint,
are  surely to  be preferred  over none  at all.
The  Role  of Analysis
Economic analysis  of the benefits and costs
of various proposals  plays  a very large role in
the water  game,  but not that which analysts
expect and prefer.  Economists  argue that the
decision  whether or not to construct  a water
project  should  be  based  on  whether  or  not
the  benefits  to  the  nation  exceed  its  costs.
Further,  economic  rationality  dictates  that
any participant  should calculate whether  the
expected  personal  benefits  to  be  gained  are
larger  than  the  expected  personal  costs  be-
fore deciding to support  a project.  However,
from  the perspective  of interests  in the  pro-
ject area,  the  first rule  is  irrelevant  and  the
second  rule  is  difficult  to  apply.  It does  not
matter  if national economic  benefits  are  less
than costs.  Interests in the project area focus
upon  the  benefits  that  are  heaped  on  their
locality  and  ignore  the  costs  which  are  dis-
tributed  to  a  diffuse  national  public.  Even
economic  analysis  showing  that recipients  of
project  water  may  have  to  pay  more  than
prospective benefits  justify probably will not
affect  project  sponsors'  behavior.  Actual  fu-
ture costs  to the user are  quite uncertain  -
especially  when  analysts  must  make  predic-
tions about projects  which may take decades
to complete and while the form of the project
is  continuously  changing.  Further,  experi-
ence has indicated that once water is  actually
conveyed to a community,  local interests  will
have  a great  deal of control  over  the  condi-
tions  and amount of project  repayment.
Instead  of helping  participants  evaluate
goals or determine strategies,  economic anal-
ysis  has  most  relevance  to  the  process  of
negotiation  among  players.  The  logic  of
quasi-economics  is  a kind  of diplomatic  pro-
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tocol  through  which  participants  bargain.
Analysis  is  used  by  participants  to  support
their own case,  and convince  others to make
certain concessions  or  abandon  certain  posi-
tions.  Having  good  "economic"  arguments
and  skill  at  marshalling  "economic  analysis"
are considerable  resources.
Willingness  to Play
In the game  of water  politics,  participants
sometimes  strike  bargains  seemingly  so  de-
trimental  to their  interests that  they  appear
irrational.  In such  cases the observer  should
ask what other alternatives were in fact avail-
able.  Frequently, the only other possibility is
to  fold and withdraw from  the game.
Whether  or not to  stay in the game  is the
only  real  decision  to  be  made  by  players.
Economic  analysis  of likely  future  benefits
and  costs  has  little  effect  upon  this  critical
choice.  Players have little faith that projected
costs  will  be  the  real  costs,  and  certainly
staying  in  the  game  cannot  be  taken  as  an
indicator that participants actually are willing
to  pay  the costs  that economic  analysts  pre-
dict  will  be  necessary.  Instead,  calculations
are  based  on  an  assessment  of the  value  of
having  the  opportunity to  obtain  additional
water,  and the  chance that this  opportunity
will be offered under favorable  conditions.
Summary and Conclusions
The  senior  author  of  this  study  and  his
economist colleagues have been studying the
economics  of  the  Central  Arizona  Project
over the  past 20 years.  Their  analytical  pos-
ture has always been to examine the possible
costs  and benefits  to  Arizona farmers  them-
selves,  regardless  of national  economic  de-
velopment  (NED)  benefits;  that  is,  a  micro
farm  management  rather  than  a macro  wel-
fare  perspective  was  taken.  They  were  re-
searching within  their role of offering  assist-
ance  to the people  of their  state.  The  major
results of these efforts  are reported  in Kelso,
Martin  and  Mack.  The  qualitative  results
have not changed  to this day.
The  results  were  always  that construction
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of the  CAP and use of CAP water  for irriga-
tion  would  yield  fewer  benefits  and  larger
costs  to  farmers  than  would  the  continued
pumping  of groundwater  without  use  of the
supplemental  CAP  source.  The  Arizona
population in general and farmers in particu-
lar  have  not  been  sympathetic  to  these  re-
sults  and the  project  is  under  construction.
To  economists,  the farmers'  attitude  did  not
seem  rational  in  that  the  purchase  of  CAP
water  did  not  seem  to be in  their own  self-
interest.
But  perhaps  when  behavior  diverges
sharply from analysts'  concept of what ration-
ality seems  to dictate,  the fault may lie in the
concept of rationality itself, and not with the
observed  behavior.  To examine  this general
hypothesis,  we  designed  a farmer survey  to
test  five  specific  hypotheses  about  farmers'
interests  in and  concerns  about  the  Central
Arizona  Project.  In  each  case,  a hypothesis
relating farmer interest in and concern  about
the project to  a "rational"  weighing of prob-
able  costs  and benefits  was  rejected.  An  al-
ternative  model  of  farmer  behavior  was
necessary.
To this  end we posit the rules of the game
in western water  development.  Basically  the
game is simply to keep your options open.  As
long  as the costs of doing so are minimal and
there  is  a possibility of benefit  in the future,
farmers  need  not  take  action  now  to  avoid
uncertain  future  costs.  Even  if  future  de-
veloped  water  costs  presumably  will  be
greater than it would be economically  ration-
al  for  them  to  pay,  experience  has  shown
them  that  once  the  physical  development
is  in  place,  the  cost  of  the  water  will  be
negotiable.
Once these rules of water development are
understood,  the behavior  of Arizona farmers
with  regard to the CAP - which seems on a
superficial  level  to  be  irrational  - makes
perfect sense.  But whether farmers eventual-
ly  will  actually  pay  rather  than  just  play
remains  to be  seen.
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